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This empirical paper documents the relationship between composition of a firm's workforce 
(with a special focus on age and gender) and its performance (productivity and profitability) 
for a large representative sample of enterprises from manufacturing industries in Germany. 
We use unique newly available data that for the first time combine information from the 
statistics of employees covered by social security that is aggregated at the enterprise level and 
information from enterprise level surveys performed by the Statistical Offices. Our micro-
econometric analysis confirms previous findings of concave age-productivity profiles, which 
are consistent with human capital theory, and adds a new finding of a rather negative effect of 
age on firms' profitability, which is consistent with deferred compensation considerations. 
Moreover, our analysis reveals for the first time that the ceteris paribus lower level of 
productivity in firms with a higher share of female employees does not go hand in hand with a 
lower level of profitability in these firms. If anything, profitability is (slightly) higher in firms 
with a larger share of female employees. This finding might indicate that lower productivity 
of women is (over)compensated by lower wage costs for women, which might be driven by 
general labor market discrimination against women. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic research has a long tradition in explaining differences in firm performance (e.g., 
Bartelsman and Doms 2000, Syverson 2011). Whereas some studies are interested in the 
effects of work practices (e.g., codetermination, training, incentive schemes) on firm 
performance, other studies are more interested in the relationship between the demographic 
structure of the workforce and firm performance. The latter stream of the literature has 
received increasing attention due to persistent inequalities in the labor market (e.g., wage 
differentials between men and women, employment problems of older workers), increasing 
female employment rates, and the demographic change which leads to an ageing workforce. 
In order to understand such inequality issues and to learn about potential aggregated 
productivity (welfare) changes in ageing societies with increasing female employment, micro-
econometric studies on the effects of the age and gender composition of firms' workforces are 
important.  
In the last two decades, several new databases have been made available for 
researchers such as establishment and linked employer employee data sets. These new data 
sources are usually large representative panel data sets, which are obtained by surveys or 
official statistics and which allow the application of advanced econometric techniques to the 
analysis of firm performance. In Germany, the most used data sets in this context are the IAB 
Establishment Panel (Fischer et al. 2009) and the linked employer employee data of the IAB 
(LIAB) (Alda, Bender and Gartner 2005), which combines the survey data of the IAB 
Establishment Panel with process produced employee data of the social security agencies. A 
disadvantage of such voluntary survey information is that information about firms' 
productivity, costs, profits, and other variables are often seen as confidential by firms and 
might include measurement errors that can distort the empirical link between explanatory 
variables and outcomes. In this paper, we use a new type of data (KombiFiD project) for 
German enterprises from the manufacturing sector that combines official statistics of 3 
employees covered by social security and information from mandatory enterprise level 
surveys performed by the German Statistical Offices. Therefore, we have more reliable 
information than most previous studies. Moreover, we can compute firms' rates of profit, 
which adds new insights into the firm performance literature as previous studies have 
primarily focused on productivity.      
Table 1 presents a review of recent econometric studies that explicitly deal with the 
effects of age and gender on firm performance. Half of these papers has been published in the 
year 2011 in a special issue "Ageing Workforce" of De Economist (2011). All studies in 
Table 1 have in common that they use linked employer employee data to study productivity 
effects of age and gender. The used data sets stem from different countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Portugal, Canada, USA, Taiwan). The main 
findings of previous research can be summarized as follows. Age-productivity profiles are 
mostly positive concave or inverse u-shape. The estimates differ however between different 
methods and specifications. The employment share of women has mostly significant negative 
effects on firm productivity in OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regressions and non significant 
effects in GMM (General Method of Moments) regressions. Especially noteworthy are the last 
three papers in Table 1 by Cardoso, Guimarares, and Varejao (2011) for Portugal, van Ours 
and Stoeldraijer (2011) for the Netherlands, and Göbel and Zwick (2011) for Germany, 
because they are most comparable to our study with respect to data, variables, specifications, 
and methods. Although previous research has analyzed firm productivity and the productivity-
wage gap, we do not know of any study that has yet analyzed explicitly the effects of age and 
gender composition of the workforce on firms' profitability.
1 Consequently, we present the 
first evidence for direct links between workforce composition and firm profits.            
                                                            
1 A paper by Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx (2003), who focus on the effects of wage dispersion on performance 
of Belgian firms, provides an appendix table (page 28) with results of OLS regressions for profits (gross 
operating surplus) per employee. The employment share of women is negatively correlated with profits and the 
employment shares of broad age categories (<25, 25-50, >50 years) seem to have an inverse u-shape effect. 4 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
In our micro-econometric analysis, we use a balanced panel of 4,225 enterprises from 
German manufacturing for the years 2003 to 2006 and apply pooled OLS regressions, fully 
robust MM regressions to account for outliers, and GMM first difference regressions to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. To anticipate our most 
important results, our analysis of this new type of German data confirms previous findings of 
positive concave age-productivity profiles and adds a new finding of a rather negative effect 
of age on firms' profitability. The finding for productivity is consistent with standard human 
capital considerations (amortization periods, depreciation). The finding for profit is consistent 
with deferred compensation considerations (underpayment of younger and overpayment of 
older employees). Whereas the concave age-productivity profiles do not support fears of 
declining productivity due to an ageing workforce and cannot explain the employment 
problems of older workers, the negative effect of age on firm profits highlights the 
employment barrier for older workers from a labor demand side. Our analysis furthermore 
reveals for the first time that the ceteris paribus lower level of productivity in firms with a 
higher share of female employees does not go hand in hand with a lower level of profitability 
in these firms. If anything, profitability is (slightly) higher in firms with a larger share of 
female employees. This finding might indicate that lower productivity of women is 
(over)compensated by lower labor costs for women, which in turn might indicate general 
labor market discrimination against women or lower reservation wages and less engagement 
in individual wage bargaining by women.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and the 
definition of variables and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents and discusses the 
approaches for our micro-econometric investigation. Section 4 contains the results of our 5 
micro-econometric analyses. The paper concludes in Section 5 with a summary and 
discussion of our results as well as comments on the used newly available data for enterprises 
from German manufacturing. 
 
2.  Data, definition of variables and descriptive statistics  
The empirical investigation uses data for enterprises
2 from manufacturing industries that come 
from two sources. The first source is the cost structure survey for enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector. This survey is carried out annually by the statistical offices as a 
representative random sample survey stratified according to the number of employees and the 
industries (see Fritsch et al. 2004). The sample covered by the cost structure survey represents 
all enterprises with at least 20 employees from manufacturing industries. About 45 percent of 
the enterprises with 20 to 499 employees and all enterprises with 500 and more employees are 
included in the sample.
3 While firms with 500 and more employees are covered by the cost 
structure survey in each year, the sample of smaller firms is part of the survey for four years 
in a row only.  
This survey is the source for information on productivity, profitability, firm size and 
industry affiliation: 
Productivity is measured as labor productivity, defined as value added per head (in 
Euro and in current prices). Information on the capital stock of a firm is not available from the 
cost structure survey, so more elaborate measures of total factor productivity cannot be used 
                                                            
2 Data are for legal units (enterprises, or Unternehmen), not for local production units (establishments, or 
Betriebe). In this paper we use the term firm as a synonym for enterprise. 
3 For details see the quality report for the cost structure survey published by the Federal Statistical Office that is 




4 Bartelsman and Doms (2000, p. 575) point to the fact that heterogeneity in 
labor productivity has been found to be accompanied by similar heterogeneity in total factor 
productivity in the reviewed research where both concepts are measured. In a recent 
comprehensive survey Chad Syverson (2011) argues that high-productivity producers will 
tend to look efficient regardless of the specific way that their productivity is measured.
5 
Furthermore, Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) show that productivity measures that 
use sales (i.e. quantities multiplied by prices) and measures that use quantities only are highly 
positively correlated. Labor productivity is computed as: 
 
 
total sales (w/o sales taxes) 
   costs for materials (w/o sales taxes)
   other costs 
   taxes (w/o sales taxes) 
   subsidies received







     (1) 
 
Profitability of a firm is computed as a rate of return, defined as gross firm surplus 
(computed in line with the definition of the European Commission (1998) as gross value 
                                                            
4 Annual data for investments are available from a separate survey on investments (Investitionserhebung) that 
can be linked to the data used here. A careful inspection of these investment data revealed that they should not be 
used to construct estimates of the capital stock of the firm by using the perpetual inventory method. The crucial 
problem here lies in the fact that investment at the firm level tends to be highly volatile. Often very high values 
in some year and very low values (or no investments at all) in some other year are reported, and this leads to 
rather different values for the capital stock proxy variable depending on the year(s) used. A proxy for the 
physical capital used in a firm can be constructed using information based on the amount of depreciation 
reported in the cost structure survey (see Wagner (2010) for details). Depreciation, however, is governed by 
accounting rules, i.e., it is not necessarily representative for the true economic loss of value of investment goods.  
5 See International Study Group on Exports and Productivity (ISGEP) (2008) for a comparison of results for 
productivity differentials between exporting and non-exporting firms based on sales per employee, value added 
per employee and total factor productivity. Results proved remarkably robust. 7 
added at factor costs minus gross wages and salaries minus costs for social insurance paid by 




grossvalueadded   grosswages   costsforsocialinsurance
rateof profit = 





Firm size is measured by the number of people working in a firm. This measure is also 
included in squares in the empirical models to take care of non-linearity in the relation 
between firm size and firm performance. 
Industry affiliation of a firm is recorded at the two-digit level. 
The second source of data is the Establishment History Panel (Betriebs-Historik-
Panel).
7 Details aside, this data set is built from individual level information for employees 
covered by social security.
8 In a first step for each year from 1975 onwards information for all 
employees working in a local production unit (establishment) was aggregated, and this is the 
standard version of the Establishment History Panel. In this study we use a different version 
of the Establishment History Panel. Here for multi-establishment enterprises information from 
all establishments of the enterprise was aggregated in a second step. The result is a data set 
with detailed information about the characteristics of the employees (covered by social 
security) in each enterprise in a year. 
                                                            
6 Note that the data set does not have any information on the capital stock, or the sum of assets or equity, of the 
firm, so that it is not possible to construct profit indicators based thereon like return on assets or return on equity. 
7 For an introduction to the Establishment History Panel see Spengler (2008); a detailed description of the 
current version is Hethey-Maier and Seth (2010). 
8 “All employees who are subject to at least one of the following compulsory insurances are liable to social 
security: health insurance, long-term care insurance, pension insurance, unemployment and accident insurance. 
However, not liable to social security and thus not included in the data are civil servants, conscripts, those doing 
alternative civilian service, self-employed, judges, scholars, students, pensioners, clergy and others.” (Spengler 
2008, p. 502)  8 
Information reported to the social security system includes, among others, the sex of a 
person, the age and the qualification (educational level attained and vocational training 
concluded). 
Share of employees from a certain age group is defined as the total number of 
employees (covered by social security) from the respective age group over the total number of 
employees (covered by social security) in an enterprise; the share is measured as a percentage. 
Share of female employees is defined as the total number of females (covered by social 
security) over the total number of employees (covered by social security) in an enterprise; the 
share is measured as a percentage. 
Share of medium qualified employees is defined as the total number of employees 
(covered by social security) with either the high-school diploma (Abitur) as the highest 
educational level attained or with vocational training concluded over the total number of 
employees (covered by social security) in an enterprise; the share is measured as a percentage. 
Share of highly qualified employees is defined as the total number of employees with a 
polytech or university degree over the total number of employees (covered by social security) 
in an enterprise; the share is measured as a percentage.
9 
Share of part-time employees is defined as the total number of employees in part-time 
over the total number of employees (covered by social security) in an enterprise; the share is 
measured as a percentage. 
The cost structure survey for enterprises in the manufacturing sector is conducted by 
the German statistical offices. The data can be accessed for scientific research via the 
Research Data Centres of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the 
Federal States (see Zühlke et al. 2004). The Establishment History Panel is build from 
                                                            
9 Note that this information on the diversity of the employees is not available in more detail; for example, the 
number of female employees aged 30 to 34 with a university degree is not available from the data (although it 
would be possible to compute this figure from the individual level information available). 9 
administrative data by the Research Data Centre of the Federal Employment Agency at the 
Institute for Employment Research. The data can be accessed via this Research Data Centre 
for scientific research (see Spengler 2008).  
Linking these confidential firm level information across the borders of the data 
producers, however, is difficult. Details aside, it is technically not easy (but not impossible 
either) and it is legal only if the firm agreed in written form. The basic idea of the project 
KombiFiD (an acronym that stands for Kombinierte  Firmendaten für Deutschland, or 
combined firm level data for Germany) that is in detail described on the web (see 
www.kombifid.de) is to ask a large sample of firms from all parts of the German economy to 
agree to match confidential micro data for these firms that are kept separately by three data 
producers (the Statistical Offices, the Federal Employment Agency, and the German Central 
Bank) in one data set. These matched data are made available for scientific research while 
strictly obeying the data protection law, i.e. without revealing micro level information to 
researchers outside the data producing agencies. In KombiFiD 54,960 firms were asked to 
agree in written form to merge firm level data from various surveys and administrative data 
for the reporting years 2003 to 2006. 30,944 firms replied and 16,571 agreed. These 16,571 
firms are in the KombiFiD Agreement Sample.  
The sample of enterprises used in the empirical investigation performed here consists 
of all firms from manufacturing industries in West Germany
10 in the KombiFiD Agreement 
Sample for which information from both data sources – the cost structure survey and the 
Establishment History Panel - could be linked in the KombiFiD project. Enterprises that do 
                                                            
10 The sample is limited to firms from West Germany. There are large differences between enterprises from West 
Germany and the former communist East Germany even many years after the unification in 1990. Therefore, an 
empirical study should be performed separately for both parts of Germany. The KombiFiD Agreement Sample 
for East German manufacturing firms, however, contains only a small number of firms, and this sample turned 
out to be not representative for the population of firms in a replication study that compares results based on the 
complete cost structure survey data and data from the KombiFiD Agreement Sample (see Wagner 2011).  10 
not have complete information for each year from 2003 to 2006 were dropped from the 
computations.
11 This leads to a balanced panel data set with 16,900 observations for 4,225 
firms and 4 years. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables and the pooled data are reported in   
Table 2.  It is evident from these descriptive statistics that the variation of the share of females 
and of the share of employees in the two large qualification groups are small over the four 
years covered compared to the variation between the firms in the sample. The same holds for 
the variation of firm size. Therefore, the within firm variation of important dimensions of 
diversity of the employees over time cannot be used in fixed effects models to sufficiently 
identify any relationship between changes in firm performance over time and diversity of 
employees. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Furthermore, a comparison of the mean and the standard deviation of the variables 
indicate that some firms may have characteristics that differ by orders of magnitude from the 
rest of the firms in the sample. Unfortunately, due to strict data protection rules it is not 
possible to report the minimum and maximum values of the variables in Table 2 (because 
these are figures for a single firm that may not be revealed). This is less a problem for all the 
variables that are defined as shares, because the values of these variables are bound between 
zero and one hundred percent by definition. For value added per head, the rate of profit and 
                                                            
11 Firms with incomplete information for any variable in at least one year were dropped from all computations 
because there are, on the one hand, by construction no entries due to the fact that the firms taking part in the cost 
structure survey were sampled before the start of the survey in 2003. On the other hand, exits cannot be 
identified because firms with information in, say, 2003 but not in 2004 might have closed down – they might 
have, however, relocated out of manufacturing (or out of Germany) or they might have shrunk below the cut-off 
point relevant for the cost-structure survey.  11 
firm size, however, we know from (unpublished) results of investigations of the KombiFiD 
Agreement Sample that for some firms there are extremely low or high values of these 
variables. These extreme observations, or outliers, may be highly influential in any empirical 
investigation. This aspect of the data, therefore, should be taken care of. 
 
3.  Approaches for the micro-econometric investigation 
The investigation of the link between diversity of employees (especially the composition of 
the workforce by age and gender) and two dimensions of firm performance (productivity and 
profitability) uses empirical models that regress the performance variable on the shares of 
employees from different age groups, the share of female employees
12, the shares of highly 
and medium qualified employees, the share of part-time employees, and on the firm size 
(number of employees) which is also included in squares to take care of a non-linear 
relationship, a set of dummy variables for years and industries, and a constant. We consider 
two variants of this empirical model. Model 1 includes two variables for the share of 
employees aged 30 to 49 years and for the share of employees aged 50 years or older (taking 
the group of employees which are less than 30 years old as the reference group). Model 2 
includes ten variables for the shares of employees aged 15 – 19 years, 20 – 24 years, 25 – 30 
years, etc. up to the share of employees aged 65 or older.
13 We decided to include the group 
                                                            
12 As a robustness check all models were re-estimated with an additional squared term of the female share. The 
estimates were not significantly affected. The coefficients of the squared terms are non significant whereas the 
coefficients of the linear terms remain their size and significance. It should however be kept in mind that the 
mean female employment share is about 30 percent across all firms in our sample and that most manufacturing 
firms have a male dominated workforce. Consequently, our sample does not allow to draw conclusions about 
female dominated workforces and further increases of the female employment share. To economize on space 
results are not reported here but are available from the corresponding author on request. 
13 As a robustness check all models were estimated with the median age of the employees and its squared value 
instead of the shares of employees for various age groups. Results for the other variables in the empirical model 
did not reveal a different picture. To economize on space results are not reported here but are available from the 
corresponding author on request. 12 
65 or older separately in order to account for potential anomalies (e.g., motivation, remaining 
paid holidays) in the last year before retirement and among the few employees working 
beyond the legal retirement age of 65 years. 
Note that these regression equations are not meant to be an empirical model to explain 
labor productivity or profitability at the enterprise level; the data set at hand here is not rich 
enough for such an exercise. They are just a vehicle to test for, and estimate the size of, the 
relation between firm performance and one dimension of workforce diversity controlling for 
other firm characteristics. Furthermore, note that productivity differences at the firm level are 
notoriously difficult to explain empirically. “At the micro level, productivity remains very 
much a measure of our ignorance.” (Bartelsman and Doms 2000, p. 586) Syverson (2011) 
surveys the recent literature on determinants of productivity at the firm level. Inter alia, he 
mentions effects of competition, organizational structures within firms, payment systems, 
other human resources practices, managerial talent, human capital, higher-quality capital 
inputs, information technology (IT) and R&D. All these determinants of productivity matter 
for profitability, too, and they cannot be looked at here with the data at hand. These 
limitations should be kept in mind when putting the results into perspective. 
In a first step, the empirical models were estimated for the pooled data from 2003 to 
2006 by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The descriptive statistics presented above revealed 
that the variation of the share of females and of the share of employees in the two large 
qualification groups are small over the four years covered compared to the variation between 
the firms in the sample. The same holds for the variation of firm size. Therefore, the within 
firm variation of important dimensions of diversity of the employees over time cannot be used 
to identify any relationship between changes in firm performance over time and diversity of 
employees by adding fixed firm effects. To take care of the dependence of the error term 13 
between observations from one firm over the four years the standard errors of the estimated 
regression coefficients are clustered at the firm level.
14 
In a second step, we take care of the fact (mentioned in the discussion of the 
descriptive statistics for the data used here) that some firms have values for some variables 
(value added per head, the rate of profit and firm size) that are extremely low or high 
compared to the other firms in the sample. This often happens when one investigates a sample 
of heterogeneous firms. These extreme values might be the result of reporting errors (and, 
therefore, wrong), or due to idiosyncratic events or to firm behavior that is vastly different 
from the behavior of the majority of firms in the sample.  
Observations of this kind are termed outliers. Whatever the reason may be, extreme 
values of productivity or profitability may have a large influence on the mean value of the 
performance variable and on the estimates of the coefficients that show the link between firm 
performance and a dimension of diversity of the workforce. Conclusions, therefore, might be 
influenced by a small number of firms with extremely high or low values of productivity or 
profitability.  
Researchers from the field of micro-econometrics of firm activities usually are aware 
of all of this. Given that due to confidentiality of the firm level data single observations as a 
rule cannot be inspected closely enough to detect and correct reporting errors, or to 
understand the idiosyncratic events that lead to extreme values, a widely used procedure to 
keep these extreme observations from shaping the results is to drop the observations from the 
top and bottom one percent of the distribution of the variable under investigation. A case in 
point is the international comparison study on the exporter productivity premium by the 
International Study Group on Exports and Productivity (ISGEP) (2008, p. 610). 
                                                            
14 As a robustness check we have also performed OLS regressions for the four separate years, which did not 
show noteworthy differences. To economize on space results are not reported here but are available from the 
corresponding author on request. 14 
Dropping the firms from the top and the bottom one percent of the productivity 
distribution and comparing the results of empirical investigations with and without these firms 
with extremely high or extremely low values of labor productivity might be considered as a 
first and useful step to check the sensitivity of results. However, although this approach seems 
to be rather popular it is in some sense arbitrary. Why the top and bottom one percent? Why 
not choose a larger or smaller cut-off point? 
There are alternative approaches to deal with extreme observations (outliers) that are 
substantiated in statistics. One approach that is advocated in the literature is Quantile 
regression. As Yasar, Nelson and Rejesus (2006, p. 682) put it: “Quantile regression estimates 
are considered robust relative to least squares estimates. In contrast to the least squares 
estimator, the quantile regression estimates place less weight on outliers and are found to be 
robust to departures from normality.”  Quantile regression at the median is identical to least 
absolute deviation (LAD) regression that minimizes the sum of the absolute values of the 
residuals rather than the sum of their squares (as in OLS). This estimator is also known as the 
L1, or median regression, estimator. LAD regression, however, is not a panacea against 
outliers. To see why, following Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) we distinguish three types of 
outliers that influence the OLS estimator: vertical outliers, bad leverage points, and good 
leverage points. Verardi and Croux (2009, p. 440) illustrate this terminology in a simple linear 
regression framework (the generalization to higher dimensions is straightforward) as follows: 
“Vertical outliers are those observations that have outlying values for the corresponding error 
term (the y dimension) but are not outlying in the space of explanatory variables (the x 
dimension). Their presence affects the OLS estimation and, in particular, the estimated 
intercept. Good leverage points are observations that are outlying in the space of explanatory 
variables but that are located close to the regression line. Their presence does not affect the 
OLS estimation, but it affects statistical inference because they do deflate the estimated 
standard errors. Finally, bad leverage points are observations that are both outlying in the 15 
space of explanatory variables and located far from the true regression line. Their presence 
significantly affects the OLS estimation of both the intercept and the slope.” 
Using this terminology one can state that the median regression estimator protects 
against vertical outliers but not against bad leverage points (Verardi and Croux 2009, p. 441; 
Koenker 2005, p. 268). Full robustness can be achieved by using the so-called MM-estimator 
that can resist contamination of the data set of up to 50 percent of outliers (i.e., that has a 
breakdown point
15 of 50 percent compared to zero percent for OLS). A discussion of the 
details of this estimator is beyond the scope of this paper (see Verardi and Croux (2009) for 
this estimator and for Stata commands to compute it). Suffice it to say here that this estimator 
combines a breakdown point of 50 percent with a high efficiency (the degree of which can be 
chosen by the researcher). An explicit formula for the estimator is not available, it is 
computed by numerical optimization. 
Given that the presence of outliers can be expected to be the rule in data sets for 
heterogeneous firms it is important to document the extent to which estimation results are 
influenced by extreme observations. Therefore, the two empirical models for productivity and 
profitability are estimated using the fully robust MM-estimator, too.
16  
In a third step, we estimate GMM (General Method of Moments) first difference 
regressions (see Roodman (2009) for this estimator and for Stata commands to compute it). 
Due to the short panel and low within variance of most explanatory variables, our GMM 
estimates serve only as a robustness check and we expect imprecise estimates with large 
                                                            
15 The breakdown point of an estimator is the highest fraction of outliers that an estimator can withstand, and it is 
a popular measure of robustness. 
16 Computations were done using the ado-files provided by Verardi and Croux (2009) with the efficiency 
parameter set at 0.7 as suggested there based on a simulation study; details are available on request. As a further 
robustness check all models were estimated using quantile regression at the median, too. While in the estimation 
for model 2 for profitability no convergence was achieved, results from the other model were very similar to the 
results from the other estimation methods reported below. Details are available from the corresponding author on 
request. 16 
standard errors. Nevertheless, it is important to check for potential endogeneity issues as our 
previous estimates might only be interpreted as descriptive evidence for between firm 
differences that need not to represent causal effects.  
The first source of endogeneity might stem from an omitted variable bias. In order to 
deal with this problem, first differences are used to cancel out unobserved time invariant firm 
heterogeneity. The second source of endogeneity is concerned with reverse causality, because 
short-term productivity shocks should affect workers in- and out-flows differently across 
demographic groups and consequently affect the composition of the workforce. For example, 
a negative shock is likely to lead to relatively more layoffs of younger than older workers 
(e.g., due to employment protection legislation or internal labor markets) and a positive shock 
to the recruitment of relatively more younger than older workers. Therefore, employment 
shares of older workers could be negatively correlated with productivity shocks, which would 
lead to a downward bias in OLS if endogeneity is not taken into account properly. The same 
logic might be applicable to the gender composition. If men have on average a lower layoff 
probability than women (e.g., due to on average longer tenure, more investments in human 
capital, being the main contributor to household income, or taste-based and statistical 
discrimination), the employment share of women could be positively correlated with 
productivity shocks, which would lead to an upward bias in OLS. However, if firms reduce 
female employment in case of negative shocks, the still employed women are likely to be a 
positive selection, i.e., they should on average be more productive than the laid of women and 
might even be more productive than male counterparts. From this follows a downward bias if 
endogeneity is not taken into account properly. Thus, two opposing effects can bias estimates 
of female employment on firm performance. In order to deal with this kind of endogeneity, 
we follow the standard approach in the literature where the first differences are instrumented 
with the second and third lags of their own levels.  17 
Comparable GMM identification strategies have been used in several previous studies 
(see Table 1 in the Introduction). Due to our four year panel, the GMM first difference 
regressions are estimates for changes in firm performance and employment share variables 
from 2005 to 2006, which are instrumented with their own levels from 2004 and 2003 
because the past workforce composition cannot be affected by current short term productivity 
shocks. 
 
4.  Results of the micro-econometric investigation 
Our main empirical results for the links between dimensions of workforce composition and 
firm productivity (value added per head in Euro) are reported in Table 3 for pooled OLS and 
robust MM regressions. The estimated OLS parameters for Model 1, in which the employee 
share of workers aged below 30 years is the reference group, indicate an inverse u-shape 
relationship between age and productivity. The share of employees aged 30-49 years is 
significantly positively correlated with productivity. A one percentage point increase in the 
employment share of these middle aged workers increases productivity by about 204 Euros 
per head. The employment share of older workers aged 50 years or older has also a positive 
coefficient, which is however not statistical significant at conventional levels. The share of 
female employees has the significant negative impact on productivity known from previous 
studies. A one percentage point increase in female employment decreases productivity by 
about 219 Euros per head. Since women work on average fewer hours than men, this negative 
effect could be simply the result of fewer working hours and not of lower productivity. In 
order to deal with this problem, we control for the share of part-time employees in a firm, 
which has also a significant negative effect and should at least partly take out differences in 
working hours. Moreover, our results are consistent with Cardoso, Guimarares, and Varejao 
(2011) and Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011), who find in their OLS regressions negative 
correlations between the female share and productivity per hour, which explicitly deals with 18 
gender differences in working hours. Our results further reveal the plausible result that firms 
with a more qualified workforce have a higher average labor productivity and that the 
relationship between firm size and productivity is concave. 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
In order to check for potentially influential outliers, we re-estimated Model 1 with the 
robust MM regression technique that supports our main findings from OLS. The estimated 
coefficients are slightly smaller and the estimated standard errors are substantially smaller for 
most variables in the robust MM regression, which leads to higher significance levels. 
Although the coefficient for the oldest age group is now significant and positive, we still find 
an inverse u-shape relationship between age and productivity. The estimated negative 
coefficient of the employment share of women is 189 Euros in the robust MM regression 
compared to 219 Euros in OLS. A noteworthy difference arises for firm size, which is likely 
driven by influential outliers. Whereas OLS indicates a positive concave relationship, as the 
maximum is reached at more than 70,000 employees, the robust MM regression suggests an 
inverse u-shape with a maximum at about 4,000 to 5,000 employees.      
As we are especially interested in age-productivity profiles, Model 2 with less 
aggregated age groups is also estimated with OLS and robust MM regressions. The results in 
Table 3 show no noteworthy changes in the estimated parameters for the other variables so 
that we focus on age. In order to facilitate interpretation, we plotted the estimated coefficients 
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for OLS in Figure 1 and for robust MM in Figure 
2. Note that the share of employees aged below 20 years serves as reference group and that 
we neglect the oldest age group with workers aged 65 years and older, because they might be 
not normal workers anymore. Both plotted age-productivity profiles show in principal the 
same pattern. Productivity increases for younger workers approximately until age 30 and does 19 
not significantly change afterwards. Thus, we find rather a positive concave than an inverse u-
shape age-productivity profile that does not support potential negative productivity effects due 
to an ageing workforce.              
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
Table 4 presents our main empirical results for the links between workforce 
composition and firm profitability (rate of profit in percent) for pooled OLS and robust MM 
regressions. Note that the explained variance of profits is rather low (R²=0.041 for Model 1, 
R²=0.047 for Model 2), which indicates that firm profits are more influenced by random 
shocks than is firm productivity. The descriptive statistics (see Table 2 in Section 2) also 
reveal that the coefficient of variation for the rate of profit (CV=9.55/8.12=1.18) is 
substantially larger than for the value added per head (CV=30320.34/57812.53=0.52). Our 
empirical models are not meant to indentify business strategies to increase profitability but to 
analyze if firms with different workforce compositions differ in their profitability. In fact, the 
overall low explanation power of our models strengthens the few significant findings, even if 
they are rather small from a quantitative perspective. Again, we will at first discuss the results 
for Model 1, before we will discuss the age-profit profiles obtained for Model 2.     
 
[Table 4 near here] 
 
The OLS results for Model 1 in Table 4 indicate a negative correlation of age and the 
rate of profit. Compared to the reference group of young employees, a one percentage point 
increase in the share of employees aged 30 to 49 years decreases the rate of profit by about 20 
0.044 percentage points.
17 The share of workers aged 50 years or older has even a negative 
impact of 0.117 percentage points. The share of female employees is positively correlated 
with profitability. A one percentage point increase in female employment is correlated with a 
0.03 percentage point higher rate of profit. For our further employment structure variables no 
significant coefficients have been estimated, except for a surprisingly negative coefficient of 
highly qualified employees with college degrees. The estimated coefficients and standard 
errors are again smaller in the robust MM than in the OLS regressions, but the main findings 
do not change noteworthy. Estimates for Model 2 also do not show noteworthy differences. 
Model 2 allows however to look more precisely at the age-profit profiles, which are plotted in 
Figure 3 for OLS and in Figure 4 for robust MM regressions. It can be seen that profitability 
increases until age 30, as was the case for productivity, and decreases afterwards, compared to 
rather flat productivity profiles.  
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
[Figure 4 near here] 
 
Our results from pooled OLS regressions and robust MM regressions, which take care 
of influential outliers in the data, are in principal only correlations and need not to be causal 
due to potential endogeneity issues stemming from omitted variables and reverse causality. 
Therefore, we perform GMM first difference regressions for Model 2 as robustness checks. 
The results are presented in Table 5. As expected, the estimated parameters are imprecise (and 
large) and have large standard errors, which is likely to occur because we can only analyze the 
differences between 2006 and 2005 due to our four year panel. Hence, we stress again that the 
                                                            
17 The effects might seem small at first glance. If we compute relative effects (coefficients divided by mean of 
dependent variable), the size of the coefficients have also economic relevance. For example, a coefficient of 0.1 
is a relative effect of approximately 0.1/8=1.25%, i.e., a ten percentage point increase in an employment share is 
correlated with a 12.5 percent higher rate of profit. 21 
results of our GMM regressions should not be overemphasized and serve only as a robustness 
check.  
 
[Table 5 near here] 
 
In the GMM productivity regressions (see Table 5), only the female share and the 
employment shares of age groups have significant effects. Compared to our previous results, 
the female share has now turned from a significant negative to a significant positive effect on 
productivity. Although we can only speculate, this finding could indicate a downward bias in 
pooled OLS and robust MM regressions that is driven by a positive selection of the remaining 
women in case of negative productivity shocks. Figure 5 plots the age-productivity profile, 
which is again positive concave. The GMM regressions for profitability (see Table 5) reveal a 
positive coefficient for the female employment share, which is however not significant. The 
age-profit profile in Figure 6 shows an increase until age 30 and a slight decline afterwards, 
although differences between age groups are not statistically significant. Despite low 
statistical significance, the overall GMM results support our previous findings from pooled 
OLS and robust MM regressions, except for the relationship between female employment and 
productivity.  
  
[Figure 5 near here] 
[Figure 6 near here] 
 
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
We start our discussion with a short summary of our basic findings about age and gender 
effects on firm performance. In line with previous research, we find concave age-productivity 
profiles that increase until age 30 and are flat afterwards. The age-profit profiles indicate an 22 
increase until age 30 and a decline afterwards. The employment share of women and 
productivity are significantly negatively correlated in our pooled OLS and robust MM 
regressions but significantly positively correlated in the GMM regressions. Profitability seems 
to be positively correlated with the share of female employees in all our regressions, though 
not significantly in the GMM regressions. Overall, most of our findings on firm productivity 
are in line with findings from previous research, which has been summarized in Table 1, and 
we have also provided new findings on firm profitability. 
Our finding for age and productivity is consistent with standard human capital 
considerations. Human capital theory (Mincer 1974) implies that incentives to invest in 
human capital decrease with age as the amortization period decreases. Moreover, human 
capital is usually subject to depreciation. Both arguments lead to concave or even inverse u-
shape age-productivity profiles. Our finding for age and profit is consistent with deferred 
compensation considerations (Lazear 1979). In deferred compensation models with long-term 
employment contracts, younger workers are paid below their marginal product and older 
workers are paid above their marginal product in order to provide work incentives. 
Consequently, firms' short term profits are positively affected by younger workers with short 
tenure, who pay loans to the firm, and negatively by older workers with long tenure, who get 
the repayments of their loans. Although we cannot explicitly analyze tenure effects due to 
missing information in the data, age can be interpreted in this context because the German 
manufacturing sector is characterized by stable employment so that age and tenure are quite 
collinear. Moreover, seniority arrangements with respect to age are usually part of collective 
contracts, which are binding to most firms in the German manufacturing sector. Whereas the 
concave age-productivity profiles cannot explain the employment problems of older workers, 
the negative effect of older workers on profits highlights the employment barrier for older 
workers from a labor demand side that might be explained by deferred compensation schemes 
(Hutchens 1986; Heywood, Jirjahn and Tsertsvardze 2010). A similar conclusion can be 23 
drawn from previous studies that analyze the productivity-wage gap (e.g., Cardoso, 
Guimarares, and Varejao 2011; Cataldi, Kampelmann, and Rycx 2011; van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer 2011). Moreover, our findings are important as they do not support the fear of 
declining productivities in ageing societies.   
Although our findings for gender and productivity are not clear from a causal 
perspective, we could document that firms with higher shares of female employees do not 
have lower levels of profitability. If anything, profitability is (slightly) higher in firms with a 
larger share of female employees. This finding might indicate that the often reported lower 
productivity of women is (over)compensated by lower labor costs for women, which in turn 
might indicate general labor market discrimination against women. The related rationale 
based on taste-based discrimination (Becker 1988) would be that owners need to be 
compensated with higher profits, if they employ women whom they dislike because of their 
gender. This discrimination argument is in principal valid for all employees with profit 
sharing schemes and not only for owners, who are unlikely to have personnel contact with 
employees in larger firms. Another rationale based on labor supply considerations is that 
women are willing to accept lower wages due to lower reservation wages (Humpert and 
Pfeifer 2011) and less engagement in individual wage bargaining (Babcock and Laschever 
2003; Bertrand 2010).  
Based on our results, we can speculate about effects of affirmative action policies, 
which are unlikely to be clear-cut. Enforced increases of female employment via legal 
employment quotas might have the perverse effect of increasing profits for capital owners and 
of decreasing the productivity in an economy, which is likely to reduce welfare due to lower 
wages and higher prices. Equal pay legislation might lead to the adverse effect of reducing 
female employment, if owners or other employees with profit sharing insist on a 
compensation for their utility loss from distaste. However, if firms' profits would be only 
larger due to an underpayment of women reasoned by lower reservation wages and fewer 24 
wage bargaining activities, equal pay legislation might not have adverse effects on female 
employment but on firms' profits. Overall, a combination of female quotas and equal pay 
legislation might be necessary to effectively improve the employment situation of women and 
to reduce gender wage gaps. If such a policy would be efficient, is however questionable and 
needs more research (e.g., natural experiments). Moreover, new gender inequalities and 
injustices in the labor market might arise in favor of young women and to the disadvantage of 
young men.  
To conclude our paper, we want to shortly discuss the new type of enterprise data 
(KombiFiD) that we have used in this paper. We could demonstrate that the newly available 
KombiFiD-Data (described in detail in Section 2) that combine for the first time enterprise 
level data produced by the Statistical Offices and by the Federal Employment Agency are a 
highly valuable data base for economic research. The data are of a high quality, and 
participation of the enterprises in the cost structure survey and in the delivery of information 
on the employees covered by social security is mandated. Instead of opinions and 
“guesstimates” collected in surveys with voluntary participation, the KombiFiD-Data have 
reliably information on variables like value added per head and the rate of turnover 
profitability that are difficult to collect in interviews or questionnaires without mandatory 
participation. Evidently, the KombiFiD-Data have shortcomings. The panel is short (covering 
only four years from 2003 to 2006), the information on the enterprises is far from 
comprehensive (for example, no information on the presence or not of a works council is 
available, and the same holds for international firm activities except exports) and the 
enterprise data are not linked with individual level data for the employees in a linked 
employer-employee data set. That said, in our view the KombiFiD-Data should at least be 
carefully looked at by researchers from various fields in economics (including labor 
economics, industrial organization and international economics) interested in working with 25 
firm level data. The access is easy and costless (for details, see www.kombifid.de) and the 
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Table 1: Review of recent econometric studies on the effects of age and gender on firm performance 
Study  Country, years, data  Estimation methods  Firm performance 
indicators 
Workforce composition 
measures  Main findings 
Haltiwanger, Lane, and 
Spletzer (1999) 
USA, 1985-1997, linked 
employer employee data 
OLS: pooled levels 1990 
& 1994, pooled 
differences 1986-1990 & 
1990-1994 with lag of 
productivity level 
Productivity: log sales 
per head 
Age: employment shares 
(<30, 30-55, >5) 
Women: employment 
share 
Age: negative for levels, positive for 
differences  







OLS: pooled, fixed 
effects 
GMM: dynamic model 
with first lag of 
productivity 
Productivity: log value 




Age: inverse u-shape (max at age 37) 
Women: negative 
 
Lallemand and Rycx 
(2009) 
Belgium, 1995 & 2003, 
linked employer 
employee data 
OLS for cross sections  Productivity: log value 
added per head 
Age: employment shares 
(<30, 30-49, >49) 
Age: negative 




employee data  
OLS: pooled, fixed 
effects 
Productivity: log sales 
per head, Solow residual, 
Levinsohn-Petrin 
Age: employment shares 
(<30, 30-55, >55) 
Women: employment 
share (of men) 
Age: inverse u-shape 
Women: negative 





OLS: pooled, IV  Productivity: log total 
factor productivity 
Age: employment shares 
(<33, 33-41, 42-50, >50) 
Women: employment 
share (of men) 
Age: inverse u-shape 
Women: negative 
Dostie (2011)  Canada, 1999-2005, 
linked employer 
employee data  
OLS  Productivity: log value 
added, Levinsohn-Petrin 
Age: employment shares 
(<35, 35-54, >54) 
 
Age: positive concave, inverse u-shape 
Vandenberghe (2011)  Belgium, 1998-2006, 
linked employer 
employee data 
OLS: pooled, first 
difference 
GMM: first difference, 
second and third lags as 
instruments 
Productivity: log value 
added per head 
Age, women: separate 
employment shares (18-
29, 30-49, 50-64) for 
men and women 
Age: negative 
Women: negative 29 
Cataldi, Kampelmann, 




OLS: pooled, first 
difference 
GMM: first difference, 
second lags as 
instruments 
Productivity: log value 
added per hour 
Age: employment shares 
(<30, 30-50, >50) 
 
Age: positive concave for pooled OLS, 
negative after age 50 for first 







OLS: pooled, fixed 
effects 
GMM: system, dynamic 
models with first lag of 
productivity 
Productivity: log total 
factor productivity, log 
value added per hour 
Age: mean, employment 




Women: significantly negative only in 
pooled OLS  
Cardoso, Guimarares, 




OLS: pooled, fixed 
effects 
GMM: first difference, 
second and third lags as 
instruments 
Productivity: log sales 
per hour 
Age: employment shares 
(5 year grouping) 
Women: employment 
share 
Age: inverse u-shape for pooled OLS 
(max at age 40-44), negative for fixed 
effects OLS after age 35, and positive 
concave for GMM until age 50 
Women: significantly negative for OLS 
(pooled and fixed effects), but non 
significantly positive for GMM 






OLS: pooled, first 
difference 
GMM: first difference, at 
least second lags as 
instruments 
Productivity: log value 
added per head 
Age: employment shares 




Age: inverse u-shape for pooled OLS 
(max at age 35-39), not significant for 
first difference OLS, and positive 
concave for GMM 
Women: significantly negative for 
pooled OLS, but not significant for first 
difference OLS, non significantly 
positive for GMM 
 
Göbel and Zwick (2011)  Germany, 1997-2005, 
linked employer 





dynamic models with 
first and second lags of 
productivity 
Productivity: log value 
added per head 
Age: employment shares 
(5 year grouping) 
Women: employment 
share 
Age: inverse u-shape in manufacturing 
sectors for OLS, but not significant in 
service sectors and for GMM 
Women: negative in manufacturing, 
but not significant in service sectors for 
OLS and for GMM 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Standard deviation 
Variables Mean  Overall  Between  Within 
Value added per head (Euro)  57812.53  30320.34  27734.55  12257.83 
Rate of profit (%)  8.12  9.55  8.28  4.76 
Share of employees aged less than 30 years (%)  17.16  9.39  8.98  2.75 
Share of employees aged 30 – 49 years (%)  57.57  9.33  8.72  3.32 
Share of employees aged 50 years or older (%)  25.25  10.10  9.66  2.94 
Share of employees aged 15 – 19 years (%)  3.10  3.92  3.60  1.55 
Share of employees aged 20 – 24 years (%)  6.46  4.59  4.13  2.01 
Share of employees aged 25 – 29 years (%)  7.60  4.58  4.11  2.02 
Share of employees aged 30 – 34 years (%)  10.84  5.05  4.30  2.64 
Share of employees aged 35 – 39 years (%)  16.00  5.43  4.63  2.84 
Share of employees aged 40 – 44 years (%)  16.72  5.18  4.36  2.80 
Share of employees aged 45 – 49 years (%)  14.01  5.11  4.42  2.56 
Share of employees aged 50 – 54 years (%)  11.44  5.04  4.47  2.31 
Share of employees aged 55 – 59 years (%)  8.20  4.80  4.28  2.18 
Share of employees aged 60 – 64 years (%)  4.06  3.59  3.04  1.92 
Share of employees aged 65 years or older (%)  1.55  2.79  2.55  1.13 
Share of female employees (%)  30.12  20.76  20.63  2.38 
Share of low skilled employees (%)  22.44  18.56  18.33  2.95 
Share of medium qualified employees (%)  61.52  20.54  20.24  3.47 
Share of highly qualified employees (%)  6.03  7.85  7.70  1.50 
Share of part-time employees (%)  18.18  14.60  14.23  3.27 
Firm size (number of employees)  429.68  3649.52  3644.74  192.87 
Note: The data are from a balanced panel (4 years from 2003 to 2006) with a total of 16,900 yearly observations for 4,225 
enterprises. For the definitions of the variables see text. 
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Table 3: Pooled estimates for productivity 
Pooled OLS regressions  Robust MM regressions 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Employees 30 – 49 years (%)  204.2723***  195.3816*** 
(51.5160) (17.5726) 
Employees 50 years or older (%)  61.4791  103.2042*** 
(41.3389) (15.9103) 
Employees 20 – 24 years (%)  -6.7506  166.0262*** 
(139.1245) (53.4369) 
Employees 25 – 29 years (%)  512.3296***  388.5230*** 
(128.5867) (51.4711) 
Employees 30 – 34 years (%)  523.4095***  437.0036*** 
(110.3084) (44.6775) 
Employees 35 – 39 years (%)  493.5080***  452.1762*** 
(107.6693) (42.5120) 
Employees 40 – 44 years (%)  321.7099***  363.9478*** 
(104.4426) (41.9210) 
Employees 45 – 49 years (%)  266.7672**  309.0789*** 
(104.3467) (43.7561) 
Employees 50 – 54 years (%)  361.9286***  319.3821*** 
(115.4942) (43.0461) 
Employees 55 – 59 years (%)  440.9448***  439.5134*** 
(121.2577) (46.4363) 
Employees 60 – 64 years (%)  290.9312**  359.5496*** 
(138.9901) (57.1610) 
Employees 65 years or older (%)  -245.7238*  -62.2619 
(138.9297) (50.3271) 
Female  employees  (%)  -219.2244*** -233.3700*** -188.9776*** -196.9950*** 
(27.6394) (27.3801)  (9.7427)  (9.7185) 
Medium qualified employees (%)  83.4892*** 76.7838*** 44.5350*** 38.7050*** 
(17.9452) (17.7453)  (6.8354)  (6.7999) 
Highly qualified employees (%)  848.7500***  801.4342***  679.7042***  644.4257*** 
(72.3017) (69.1437) (31.2364) (29.1600) 
Part-time  employees  (%)  -369.7626*** -268.8039*** -304.9767*** -240.7307*** 
(30.4742) (33.6020) (11.0463) (12.0111) 
Firm size (number of employees)  0.9604**  0.9326**  7.8397***  7.5201*** 
(0.4818) (0.4612) (0.4700) (0.4617) 
Firm size (squared)  -6.54e-6*  -6.33e-6*  -0.0009***  -0.0008*** 
(3.49e-6) (3.35e-6) (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Constant 49982.4919***  29116.3618***  50986.4554***  30202.4348*** 
(6772.1374) (10927.3514) (3658.1811)  (4789.2448) 
Number  of  observations  16900 16900 16900 16900 
Number  of  enterprises  4225 4225 4225 4225 
R² 0.2593  0.2658 
Note: The dependent variable is value added per head (Euro). All models include dummy variables for years and 2digit-
level industries. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * p<0.10, ** 
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Table 4: Pooled estimates for profitability 
Pooled OLS regressions  Robust MM regressions 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Employees 30 – 49 years (%)  -0.0438***  -0.0231** 
(0.0161) (0.0101) 
Employees 50 years or older (%)  -0.1169***  -0.0903*** 
(0.0159) (0.0089) 
Employees 20 – 24 years (%)  0.0329  0.0372 
(0.0448) (0.0275) 
Employees 25 – 29 years (%)  0.1236***  0.0838*** 
(0.0408) (0.0246) 
Employees 30 – 34 years (%)  0.0838**  0.0654*** 
(0.0388) (0.0218) 
Employees 35 – 39 years (%)  0.0548  0.0542** 
(0.0383) (0.0213) 
Employees 40 – 44 years (%)  -0.0265  -0.0037 
(0.0364) (0.0213) 
Employees 45 – 49 years (%)  -0.0102  -0.0082 
(0.0385) (0.0211) 
Employees 50 – 54 years (%)  -0.0460  -0.0571** 
(0.0393) (0.0226) 
Employees 55 – 59 years (%)  -0.0527  -0.0241 
(0.0388) (0.0222) 
Employees 60 – 64 years (%)  -0.0043  -0.0095 
(0.0413) (0.0254) 
Employees 65 years or older (%)  0.1004*  0.0969*** 
(0.0518) (0.0291) 
Female  employees  (%)  0.0299*** 0.0304*** 0.0292*** 0.0314*** 
(0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
Medium qualified employees (%)  0.0004  0.0020  0.0027  0.0041 
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Highly qualified employees (%)  -0.1121**  -0.1191*** -0.0332*** -0.0363*** 
(0.0453) (0.0460) (0.0126) (0.0115) 
Part-time employees (%)  0.0033  -0.0009  0.0081  0.0004 
(0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0060) (0.0067) 
Firm size (number of employees)  -0.0001  -4.13e-5  -0.0001***  -0.0001*** 
(0.0001) (7.51e-5) (2.86e-5) (2.74e-5) 
Firm size (squared)  2.30e-10  4.13e-11  4.92e-10**  4.46e-10** 
(5.13e-10) (5.06e-10) (2.12e-10) (2.04e-10) 
Constant  12.6804*** 5.4955 11.2843***  5.7021** 
(2.4176) (3.7994) (2.2085) (2.5967) 
Number  of  observations  16900 16900 16900 16900 
Number  of  enterprises  4225 4225 4225 4225 
R² 0.0406  0.0471 
Note: The dependent variable is rate of profit (%). All models include dummy variables for years and 2digit-level 
industries. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * p<0.10, ** 
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Table 5: GMM first difference estimates for productivity and profitability 
Productivity Profitability 
Employees 20 – 24 years (%)  370.1960  0.3039 
(433.5095) (0.1883) 
Employees 25 – 29 years (%)  990.7642*  0.6243*** 
(560.1271) (0.2252) 
Employees 30 – 34 years (%)  1447.2803**  0.6047** 
(612.4988) (0.2362) 
Employees 35 – 39 years (%)  1167.7536*  0.3894* 
(608.8043) (0.2332) 
Employees 40 – 44 years (%)  1217.1934*  0.3380 
(635.3015) (0.2417) 
Employees 45 – 49 years (%)  1557.7039**  0.4178* 
(656.1437) (0.2410) 
Employees 50 – 54 years (%)  1309.6891*  0.3195 
(675.2281) (0.2468) 
Employees 55 – 59 years (%)  1094.0228  0.1959 
(697.9981) (0.2457) 
Employees 60 – 64 years (%)  1497.1742**  0.3894 
(701.7014) (0.2646) 
Employees 65 years or older (%)  2109.1828*  0.4270 
(1238.7614) (0.3429) 
Female employees (%)  1309.8010**  0.1403 
(652.0186) (0.1750) 
Medium qualified employees (%)  -294.2409  -0.3238*** 
(329.8124) (0.1122) 
Highly qualified employees (%)  1862.4764  -0.4977 
(2028.0992) (0.5378) 
Part-time employees (%)  -168.9521  -0.2050 
(390.1211) (0.1470) 
Firm size (number of employees)  -0.0196  0.0010 
(4.3593) (0.0010) 
Firm size (squared)  1.95e-6  -3.56e-9 
(2.03e-5) (-3.56e-9) 
Number of observations  12675  12675 
Number of enterprises  4225  4225 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions: 
²(32); prob>²  62.30; p=0.0011  30.92; p=0.5212 
Note: Twostep GMM first difference regressions for model 2. The dependent variables are value 
added per head (Euro) and rate of profit (%). First differences are instrumented with second and third 
lags of their own levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients are significant at * 





























































































































































Figure 6: Age-profit profile (model 2) for GMM regression Working Paper Series in Economics 
(recent issues) 
 
No.231:  Daniel Fackler, Claus Schnabel, and Joachim Wagner: Establishment exits in Germany: 
the role of size and age, February 2012 
No.230:  Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre: Forschungsbericht 2011, January 2012 
No.229:  Frank Schmielewski: Leveraging and risk taking within the German banking system: 
Evidence from the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, January 2012 
No.228:  Daniel Schmidt and Frank Schmielewski: Consumer reaction on tumbling funds – 
Evidence from retail fund outflows during the financial crisis 2007/2008, January 2012 
No.227:  Joachim Wagner: New Methods for the Analysis of Links between International Firm 
Activities and Firm Performance: A Practitioner’s Guide, January 2012 
No.226:  Alexander Vogel and Joachim Wagner: The Quality of the KombiFiD-Sample of 
Business Services Enterprises: Evidence from a Replication Study, January 2012 
No.225:  Stefanie Glotzbach: Environmental justice in agricultural systems. An evaluation of 
success factors and barriers by the example of the Philippine farmer network MASIPAG, 
January 2012 
No.224:  Joachim Wagner: Average wage, qualification of the workforce and export performance 
in German enterprises: Evidence from KombiFiD data, January 2012 
No.223:  Maria Olivares and Heike Wetzel: Competing in the Higher Education Market: Empirical 
Evidence for Economies of Scale and Scope in German Higher Education Institutions, 
December 2011 
No.222:  Maximilian Benner: How export-led growth can lead to take-off, December 2011 
No.221:  Joachim Wagner and John P. Weche Gelübcke: Foreign Ownership and Firm Survival: 
First evidence for enterprises in Germany, December 2011 
No.220:  Martin F. Quaas, Daan van Soest, and Stefan Baumgärtner: Complementarity, 
impatience, and the resilience of natural-resource-dependent economies, November 
2011 
No.219:  Joachim Wagner: The German Manufacturing Sector is a Granular Economy, November 
2011 
No.218:  Stefan Baumgärtner, Stefanie Glotzbach, Nikolai Hoberg, Martin F. Quaas, and Klara 
Stumpf: Trade-offs between justices , economics, and efficiency, November 2011 
No.217:  Joachim Wagner: The Quality of the KombiFiD-Sample of Enterprises from 
Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from a Replication Study, November 2011 
No.216:  John P. Weche Gelübcke: The Performance of Foreign Affiliates in German 
Manufacturing: Evidence from a new Database, November 2011 
No.215:  Joachim Wagner: Exports, Foreign Direct Investments and Productivity: Are services 
firms different?, September 2011 
No.214:  Stephan Humpert and Christian Pfeifer: Explaining Age and Gender Differences in 
Employment Rates: A Labor Supply Side Perspective, August 2011 
No.213:  John P. Weche Gelübcke: Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance in German 
Services: First Evidence based on Official Statistics, August 2011 
[forthcoming in: The Service Industries Journal] 
    
No.212:  John P. Weche Gelübcke: Ownership Patterns and Enterprise Groups in German 
Structural Business Statistics, August 2011 [published in: Schmollers Jahrbuch / Journal 
of Applied Social Science Studies, 131(2011), 4, 635-647] 
No.211:  Joachim Wagner: Exports, Imports and Firm Survival: First Evidence for manufacturing 
enterprises in Germany, August 2011 
No.210:  Joachim Wagner: International Trade and Firm Performance: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies since 2006, August 2011 
No.209:  Roland Olbrich, Martin F. Quaas, and Stefan Baumgärtner: Personal norms of 
sustainability and their impact on management – The case of rangeland management in 
semi-arid regions, August 2011 
No.208:  Roland Olbrich, Martin F. Quaas, Andreas Haensler and Stefan Baumgärtner: Risk 
preferences under heterogeneous environmental risk, August 2011 
No.207:  Alexander Vogel and Joachim Wagner: Robust estimates of exporter productivity premia 
in German business services enterprises, July 2011 [published in: Economic and 
Business Review, 13 (2011), 1-2, 7-26] 
No.206:  Joachim Wagner: Exports, imports and profitability: First evidence for manufacturing 
enterprises, June 2011 
No.205:  Sebastian Strunz: Is conceptual vagueness an asset? Resilience research from the 
perspective of philosophy of science, May 2011 
No.204:  Stefanie Glotzbach: On the notion of ecological justice, May 2011 
No.203:  Christian Pfeifer:  The Heterogeneous Economic Consequences of Works Council 
Relations, April 2011 
No.202:  Christian Pfeifer, Simon Janssen, Philip Yang and Uschi Backes-Gellner:  Effects of 
Training on Employee Suggestions and Promotions in an Internal Labor Market, April 
2011 
No.201:  Christian Pfeifer:  Physical Attractiveness, Employment, and Earnings, April 2011 
No.200:  Alexander Vogel: Enthüllungsrisiko beim Remote Access: Die Schwerpunkteigenschaft 
der Regressionsgerade, März 2011 
No.199:  Thomas Wein: Microeconomic Consequences of Exemptions from Value Added 
Taxation – The Case of Deutsche Post, February 2011 
No.198:  Nikolai Hoberg and Stefan Baumgärtner: Irreversibility, ignorance, and the 
intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off, February 2011 
No.197:  Sebastian Schuetz: Determinants of Structured Finance Issuance – A Cross-Country 
Comparison, February 2011 
No.196:  Joachim Fünfgelt and Günther G. Schulze: Endogenous Environmental Policy when 
Pollution is Transboundary, February 2011 
No.195:  Toufic M. El Masri: Subadditivity and Contestability in the Postal Sector: Theory and 
Evidence, February 2011 
No.194:  Joachim Wagner: Productivity and International Firm Activities: What do we know?, 
January 2011 [published in: Nordic Economic Policy Review, 2011 (2), 137-161] 
No.193:  Martin F. Quaas and Stefan Baumgärtner: Optimal grazing management rules in semi-
arid rangelands with uncertain rainfall, January 2011 
No.192:  Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre: Forschungsbericht 2010, Januar 2011    
No.191:  Natalia Lukomska, Martin F. Quaas and Stefan Baumgärtner: Bush encroachment 
control and risk management in semi-arid rangelands, December 2010 
No.190:  Nils Braakmann: The causal relationship between education, health and health related 
behaviour: Evidence from a natural experiment in England, November 2010 
No.189:  Dirk Oberschachtsiek and Britta Ulrich: The link between career risk aversion and 
unemployment duration: Evidence of non-linear and time-depending pattern, October 
2010 
No.188:  Joachim Wagner: Exports and Firm Characteristics in German Manufacturing industries, 
October 2010 
No.187:  Joachim Wagner: The post-entry performance of cohorts of export starters in German 
manufacturing industries, September 2010 
No.186:  Joachim Wagner: From estimation results to stylized facts: Twelve recommendations for 
empirical research in international activities of heterogenous firms, September 2010 
[published in: De Economist, 159 (2011), 4, 389-412] 
No.185:  Franziska Dittmer and Markus Groth: Towards an agri-environment index for biodiversity 
conservation payment schemes, August 2010 
No.184:  Markus Groth: Die Relevanz von Ökobilanzen für die Umweltgesetzgebung am Beispiel 
der Verpackungsverordnung, August 2010 
No.183:  Yama Temouri, Alexander Vogel and Joachim Wagner: Self-Selection into Export 
Markets by Business Services Firms – Evidence from France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, August 2010 
No.182:  David Powell and Joachim Wagner: The Exporter Productivity Premium along the 
Productivity Distribution: First Evidence from a Quantile Regression for Fixed Effects 
Panel Data Models, August 2010 
No.181:  Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Beschäftigungswirkungen arbeits- 
und sozialrechtlicher Schwellenwerte , August 2010 
[publiziert in: Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktforschung 44(2011), 1-2, 173-180] 
No.180:  Matthias Schröter, Markus Groth und Stefan Baumgärtner: Pigous Beitrag zur 
Nachhaltigkeitsökonomie, Juli 2010 
No.179:  Norbert Olah, Thomas Huth and Dirk Löhr: Monetary policy with an optimal interest 
structure, July 2010 
No.178:  Sebastian A. Schütz: Structured Finance Influence on Financial Market Stability – 
Evaluation of Current Regulatory Developments, June 2010 
No.177:  Franziska Boneberg: The Economic Consequences of One-third Co-determination in 
German Supervisory Boards: First Evidence from the German Service Sector from a 
New Source of Enterprise Data, June 2010 
[forthcoming in:  Schmollers Jahrbuch / Journal of Applied Social Science Studies] 
No.176:  Nils Braakmann: A note on the causal link between education and health – Evidence 
from the German short school years, June 2010 
No.175:  Torben Zülsdorf, Ingrid Ott und Christian Papilloud: Nanotechnologie in Deutschland – 
Eine Bestandsaufnahme aus Unternehmensperspektive, Juni 2010 
No.174:  Nils Braakmann: An empirical note on imitative obesity and a puzzling result, June 2010 
 
 
(see www.leuphana.de/institute/ivwl/publikationen/working-papers.html for a complete list)    
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 
Postfach 2440 
D-21314 Lüneburg 
Tel.: ++49 4131 677 2321 
email: brodt@leuphana.de 
www.leuphana.de/institute/ivwl/publikationen/working-papers.html  
 